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I. INTRODUCTION
“The rise of new software platform present regulators and antitrust
agencies all over the world with a challenge.”1 The transportation company
Uber Technologies, Inc. is the largest and most current example of this
phenomenon, as it exemplifies the expansion of the sharing economy without
a regulatory framework capable of addressing a host of issues.2
This Note offers a comparative analysis of the issues and challenges
presented by Uber by focusing, specifically, on those that have emerged in
Europe and Latin America including the lengthy legal battle that has
characterized its activity, since its debut back in 2009.3
This Note highlights how the evolution of markets and technology is
closely related to law, market forces and the obsolescence of legal rules.4
This is specifically demonstrated through the comparative law analysis set
out in this Note, which describes different national approaches with respect
to the problems raised by Uber: the more open one in the United States
system and the more restrictive one in Europe and in Latin America.5
The decision of the Courts —both on the European and Latin America
side— has represented a setback for the future of the American company.6
Uber has been a party in many lawsuits and scandals, resulting in “an
unprecedented polarization of the public opinion, split between defenders of
the old economy and advocates of the digital revolution.”7 The former have
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1.
Margherita Colangelo & Mariateresa Maggiolino, Uber: A New Challenge for Regulation
and Competition Law?, MKT. & COMPETITION L. REV. (forthcoming 2017), 1,
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3042514.
2.

Id.

3.
See Beniamino Pagliaro, La Vita Nuova di Uber: Perché Migliora per i Propri Autisti e
Cosa Racconta la Sua Evoluzione nel 2017 [Uber's New Life: Why it Improves for its Drivers and What
STAMPA
(Dec.
10,
2017),
its
Evolution
Tells
in
2017],
LA
https://www.lastampa.it/economia/2017/12/10/news/la-vita-nuova-di-uber-perche-migliora-per-i-propriautisti-e-cosa-racconta-la-sua-evoluzione-nel-2017-1.34081530.
4.
Luca Belviso, Il caso Uber negli Stati Uniti e in Europa fra Mercato, Tecnologia e Diritto:
Obsolescenza Regolatoria e Ruolo delle Corti [The Uber Case in the United States and Europe Between
Market, Technology and Law: Regulatory Obsolescence and the Role of the Courts], MEDIA LAWS [M.L.]
144 (2018).
5.

Id.

6.
Francesco De Masi, The Uber Case: A Ride for the Future of the European Single Market
(2016/2017) (unpublished E.B.L. thesis, Luiss University) (on file with the Department of Law, Luiss
University).
7.

Id.
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accused Uber of unfair competition, and the latter have supported its
development and fostered technological progress.8
In order to achieve a full understanding of the Uber phenomenon, the
Note describes its business model and analyses it from the perspective of the
European and South American approach, understanding the circumstances
that allowed “a small Californian start-up, aiming to revolutionize the
concept of urban transport, to become a technological giant worth billions of
dollars.”9 This requires an understanding of the American law that allowed
the rise of Uber.10 The legal issues that arose around Uber do not differ from
those in other legal systems —such as Europe and Latin America— but
which have found their original development in the North American Legal
System.11
This Note begins with a general overview of the history and
fundamental characteristics of the Uber phenomenon, from the establishment
of the company in 2009.12 It also analyzes the wide variety of services
offered by the American company and the way in which Uber has organized
its corporate structure, in the world of the Sharing Economy.13 It then
analyses the major competition law issues raised by the development of the
Uber platform, and introduces the problems concerning the qualification of
the service.14 Next it examines the Uber Case experience in Europe,
specifically in Italy and Spain, and in Latin America, specifically in
Colombia, and Costa Rica.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Uber and its Business Model: The Sharing Economy
“Sharing Economy means collaborative economy.”15 It is “an economic
system in which goods and services are shared between private individuals,
free of charge or in exchange for a sum of money, typically through

8.

Id.

9.

Id.

10.

Belviso, supra note 4, at 148.

11.

Id. at 149.

12.

Pagliaro, supra note 3.

13.
See Gianluca Modenese, La Sharing Economy: Il Caso Uber. La Visione Giurisprudenziale
e Le Prospettive Future [The Sharing Economy: The Uber Case. The Jurisprudential Vision and Future
Prospects] (2014/2015) (unpublished Econ. & Mgmt. thesis, Università degli Studi di Padova) (on file
with Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche ed Aziendali, Università degli Studi di Padova).
14.

Id.

15.

Belviso, supra note 4, at 145.
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internet.”16 “The keyword of sharing economy is sharing.”17 Authors
emphasized its social aspect, made up of community-sharing, describing this
as a move away from the criteria of maximization of profit that is typical of
the homo oeconomicus18 in a perspective of classical economy.19 In fact, it
has been observed how the “sharing economy is not a temporary reaction to
the crisis, but it is proposed as a structural rethinking of the relationship
between the economy and society, based on the creation of social links as a
basis for economic exchange.”20
Uber is one of the most popular car-sharing service in the world, and
one of the most striking manifestation of the emergence of the contemporary
car-sharing economy.21 As to the concept of sharing economy, it is common
the reference to the “Uberification of Society,” proving the strong relevance
this market player has, together with its modus operandi and organizational
structure.22
Uber is in fact a corporate group, established in the United States and
operating in numerous cities around the world.23 Founded in San Francisco
in 2009 —the city that represents the world's largest start-up incubator—24
Uber soon spread throughout the world,25 achieving considerable success
while at the same time giving rise to a series of legal disputes.26 Countries
that are very different from each other, in terms of political regime and free
market orientation, have alternatively authorized the use of Uber and

16.
Sharing Economy, OXFORD
/sharing_economy (last visited Oct. 5, 2019).
17.

DICTIONARY,

https://www.lexico.com/en/definition

Modenese, supra note 13, at 3.

ENCICLOPEDIA
ON
LINE,
18.
See
Homo
Oeconomicus,
TRECCANI
http://www.treccani.it/enciclopedia/homo-oeconomicus/ (last visited Oct. 5, 2019) (Homo Oeconomicus,
first stated by J.S. Mill, stands from abstract simplification of the complex human reality, which places as
the subject of economic activity an abstract individual, whose actions in the complex social reality can be
grasped only the economic reasons, linked to the maximization of wealth).
19.

Modenese, supra note 13, at 3.

20.
Ivana Pais & Marta Mainieri, Dossier: Sharing Economy, EQUILIBRI 11, 13 (2015),
https://www.feem.it/m/publications_pages/20154221147504Indice_AlLettore_Abstracts.pdf.
21.

Modenese, supra note 13, at 2.

22.

Belviso, supra note 4, at 146.

23.

Id.

24.
See San Francisco's 20 Best Startup Accelerators & Incubators, FOUNDER INSTITUTE (Mar.
1, 2019), https://fi.co/insight/san-francisco-s-20-best-startup-accelerators-incubators.
25.
Avery Harmans & Paige Leskin, The History of How Uber Went from the Most Feared
Startup in The World to Its Massive IPO, BUSINESS INSIDER (May 18, 2019), https://www.msn.com/enie/money/business/the-history-of-how-uber-went-from-the-most-feared-startup-in-the-world-to-itsmassive-ipo/ss-AABAL20.
26.

Modenese, supra note 13, at 11.
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opposed it.27 The countries where Uber has been sued range from some
North American States to Spain, from China to Australia, to some areas of
Latin America to South-East Asia.28
Uber has produced and marketed a mobile software application (e.g.
app) on smartphones.29 In the context of urban mobility, the Uber application
provides the meeting between demand and supply, where the members of the
community —drivers and users— can contact each other.30 The mobility
service, provided by the driver, is subject to payment by the user.31 This fee,
to be paid by credit card, is determined by the Uber group and quantified with
an automated algorithm according to the surge pricing mechanism, a
methodology according to which the price of the service increases as demand
increases.32 Also, the payment is mediated by Uber, which receives the full
payment amount, deduct the compensation for the services, and gives the
driver the remaining portion.33 Uber can also evaluate feedbacks given at the
end of the ride, and in presence of bad reviews, it may deactivate the
profiles.34 “[A] further feature of Uber's service is that it also provides a
service with differentiated bands.”35 Other than the basic low-cost option
that Uber offers, known as Uber X, there are a series of means of transport
gradually bigger and more luxurious, designed for the different types of
users.36 In fact, they range from the Uber X service, useful to move from one
point to another in the city, to planned transport services (which not
surprisingly Uber defines taxi), and then to services of higher range as the
Uber Black, where the car is a sedan high-end, or the Uber SUV service,
provided by a Superior Utility Vehicle, to the top of the range known as the
Lux service, where flagships of major car manufacturers (e.g. Porsche,
Mercedes) are offered for transport at very affordable prices.37

27.

Id.

28.

Id.

29.

Belviso, supra note 4, at 146.

30.

Id.

31.

Id.

32.
Nikhil Garg & Hamid Nazerzadeh, Driver Surge Pricing, SSRN 1, 1 (2019),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3390346.
.
33.

Belviso, supra note 4, at 146.

34.

Id.

35.

Modenese, supra note 13, at 13.

36.

Id.

37.

Id. at 13–14.
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As mentioned above, however, Uber has been at the center of a series
of legal disputes.38 It is therefore to the European and Latin American events
that the attention must be focused, highlighting on the one hand the
experience of Italy and Spain and, on the other hand, the experience of
Colombia and Costa Rica.
B. Uber and Competition Law Implications
This section explains how Uber practices can affect antitrust law.39
First, Uber does not simply provide technology.40 Uber exists and is
developing because, by connecting users and drivers through its platform, it
exploits the interdependencies41 transport demand and driving demand.42
The Uber platform may seem like a complex architecture, but it is
actually quite flexible.43 In other words, Uber can diversify its business by
combining products and services, as it did with Uber Eats.44 Clearly, this has
consequences in terms of competitive law, as it follows.45 First, because the
platform is very dynamic, it can easily enter new markets by offering
increasingly new and innovative services.46 Secondly, because in doing so
Uber will always be able to profit from strategies that ultimately produce
exclusive effects for other players in the market, although not necessarily
anti-competitive.47
Those who enter the market with the aim of offering already established
services, find themselves increasing their costs, and forced to use less and
more accessible technologies, thus reducing the quality of their offer.48 The
38.
Heather Kelly, Uber’s Never-Ending Stream of Lawsuits, CNN BUS. (Aug. 11, 2016, 10:30
AM), https://money.cnn.com/2016/08/11/technology/uber-lawsuits/.
39.

Colangelo & Maggiolino, supra note 1, at 10

40.

Id.

.

41.
Id.; David S. Evans & Michael Noel, Defining Antitrust Markets When Firms Operate TwoSided Platforms, COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 102, 105 (2005).
42.

Colangelo & Maggiolino, supra note 1, at 10.

43.

Id.

44.
Id.; see also How Does Uber Eats Make Money? Uber Eats Business Model In A Nutshell,
FOUR WK. MBA, https://fourweekmba.com/uber-eats-business-model/ (last visited Oct. 5, 2019) (in a
nutshell, Uber Eats is a three-part marketplace that connects a driver, a customer and a restaurant owner
with the Uber Eats platform, located in the center. This market moves around the three players: drivers
earn money by delivering orders on time; restaurants pay a commission on orders to Uber; customers pay
small thick shipping and sometimes cancellation fees).
45.

Colangelo & Maggiolino, supra note 1, at 10

46.

Id.

47.

Id.

48.

Id. at 11.
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aim of analyzing Uber's competitive behavior is to improve the
understanding of the strategies implemented by the Californian company, so
that the antitrust authorities and agencies at global level can have an
immediate response.49
As far as Uber practices regarding the pricing system are concerned, the
competition law has no criticism in this respect.50 The Uber system called
“surge pricing” —also called the dynamic pricing system— is not anticompetitive, but adapts perfectly to the system of supply and demand.51 The
price of the Uber does not change according to the price of the person who
buys the service, but according to other elements such as the price of
competitors, the correspondence between supply and demand, or other
external elements such as the conditions of transport.52 In other words, if the
Uber algorithm works as it says, reflecting how market supply and demand
change, there is no collusion, and therefore antitrust law cannot change the
barriers to entry that protects Uber's market power.53 In addition, Uber
collects user data through its platform, in order to retain its consumers.54 In
doing so, it improves its services, consumer welfare, and therefore profits,
and this is not prohibited by antitrust law.55 The mere existence of Uber and
its economic activity does not appear to be anti-competitive, as it does not
harm the welfare of consumers.56 The purpose of competition law and
agencies is to make markets work, not to protect competitors.57 Competition
law can only prohibit anti-competitive agreements, mergers and
monopolistic practices.58 Clearly, this does not mean that antitrust agencies
and authorities support companies that act in violation of the law.59 As to the
context of the battle that taxi drivers are waging against Uber, the aim of the
antitrust agencies is to create a single level playing field for Uber and taxi
drivers.60 Additionally, those agencies cannot prescribe obligations and

49.

Id.

50.

Colangelo & Maggiolino, supra note 1, at 11.

51.

Id.

52.

Id.

53.

Id.

54.

Id. at 12.

55.

Colangelo & Maggiolino, supra note 1, at 12.

56.

Id.

57.

Id.

58.

Id.

59.

Id.

60.

Colangelo & Maggiolino, supra note 1, at 12.
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force, for example, Uber to comply with taxi regulations, nor can they exempt
taxi drivers from those regulatory obligations to which Uber is not subject.61
As a result, it looks like the Uber problem is a regulatory problem.62
The central issue is whether and how to apply to Uber the same requirements
and obligations applied to taxi drivers.63 There are two solutions: to extend
the existing rules to the new emerging system, or to use the new system to
innovate the first.64 It would not seem right to waste opportunities the Uber
is offering, applying the same rules as traditional operators.65 Rather, it is
important to boost progress and development.66 Legislators should allow
traditional services to exploit new technologies and innovate.67 “[T]he best
way to fight illegal business models is to develop legal business models that
are equally good and efficient.”68
III. UBER: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS IN EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA
A. Uber in the United States: Where Everything Started
As to the Uber case, the American law deserves special consideration.69
The first reason for polarizing the attention towards the American legal
system, is the very origins of this market operator.70 Uber was founded in
2009 California, starting from 2010 to operate in several cities, such as San
Francisco, New York City, Chicago, Washington.71
At first, the American company established itself in the north-American
context, where it provided a new idea of mobility, with lower and competitive
prices compared with the ones of the professionals in the sector.72 It is in
those cities that the first resistance from taxi drivers has inevitably developed,
and where certain legal issues have emerged.73 These are problems which,
as we shall see, do not differ from those found in other legal systems —such
61.

Id.

62.

Id. at 14.

63.

Id.

64.

Id.

65.

Colangelo & Maggiolino, supra note 1, at 14.

66.

Id.

67.

Id.

68.

Id.

69.

Belviso, supra note 4, at 148.

70.

Id.

71.

Id.

72.

Id.

73.

Id.
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as Europe and Latin America— but which have found their original
development in the North American legal system.74
American regulation on urban mobility is affected by the federal
structure of the North American legal system, which is divided into three
distinct levels of government: federal, state and municipal.75 In the area of
taxi service, and from a regulatory point of view, the real protagonists that
intervened have been the federal states and the various municipalities.76 On
that regard, it is possible to detect heterogeneity in the different regulatory
models adopted by American cities.77 First, the provision of a system of
licenses, which confers on the municipality the power to issue licenses
beyond the predetermined number at the State level (e.g. in Los Angeles).78
Second, the existence of tariff regimes, which sometimes are predetermined
(as in San Diego and New York City), others not yet characterized by any
type of public intervention.79 Third, the “presence of service obligations,
such as that of providing the requested activity without being able to refuse,”
even if uneconomical, or that of offering services of a limited nature also to
residents of disadvantaged areas.80
The advent of Uber, as already noted, has generated strong resistance
from traditional operators and, sometimes, even interventions by the courts.81
Uber, carrying out an activity of intermediation, has ultimately satisfied the
same need for urban mobility that the taxi drivers have provided.82 For that
reason, Uber’s main accusation has been that of configuring a hypothesis of
unfair competition.83 First, the competitive advantage gained despite the lack
of homologation, violating the rules relating to the taxi service; second, the
nature of the activity itself which, as mentioned, is not dissimilar to the one
carried out by the traditional operators of the sector.84

74.

Belviso, supra note 4, at 149.

75.

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.

76.

Belviso, supra note 4, at 149.

77.

Id. at 150.

78.

Id.

79.

Id.

80.

Id.

81.
Belviso, supra note 4, at 150; see also Yellow Grp. LLC v. Uber Techs. Inc., No. 12 C 7967,
2014 WL 3396055, at *1 (N.D. Ill. July 10, 2014) (alleging unfair and deceptive acts, misrepresentation,
and unfair competition by Uber).
82.

Belviso, supra note 4, at 150–51.

83.
Id. at 151.; see also Hannah Posen, Ridesharing in the Sharing Economy: Should Regulators
Impose Über Regulations on Uber?, 101 IOWA L. REV. 405, 418 (2016).
84.

Belviso, supra note 4, at 151.
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Another accusation against Uber has been that of not belonging to the
sharing economy world, whereas those platforms are characterized by the
spirit of sharing, and Uber is allegedly not.85 An example is Anchorage,
Alaska, where it was challenged the legitimacy of the service before the
Superior Court, seeking to impose the performance of the activity in
conditions of substantial gratuitousness, therefore without profit margins for
the company.86 This claim was affirmed by Judge Micheal Corey of the
Anchorage Superior Court, and, inevitably, ended up with the choice of Uber
to inhibit the service on the territory.87
Because municipalities regulate the taxi industry, having their own
autonomy, each of them has their own ideas as to how Uber fits into their
regulatory frameworks, and as to whether or not Uber should be challenged
or rather accepted.88 Some municipalities were favorable and aimed at not
hindering the entry of the new operator, as happened in Pittsburgh; some
others, hostile to the rise of the new entrant and inclined to extend to it the
rules already applicable to traditional carriers (such as in New York City);89
and finally, municipalities that, fostering innovation, decided to regulate the
new platform, while avoiding to prevent its effective operability.90 This last
option has been implemented by several States, since it is capable —at least
in theory— of balancing the interest in technological innovation and in the
development of the market.91 Some of these states —such as California,
Colorado, Nevada, Massachusetts— have created from 2013, the category of
Transportation Network Companies (TNCs), in which Uber and all those
platforms that provide mobility services through technological tools fall
automatically.92

85.

Id.

86.

Id.

87.

Id.

88.

Posen, supra note 83, at 423.

89.
See Richard Cohen, Uber Mows Down Bill De Blasio, THE WASH. POST (July 27, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/ubers-bare-knuckle-battle-against-the-taxiindustry/2015/07/27/e0e7be98-3483-11e5-8e6607b4603ec92a_story.html?utm_term=.1c7663d78c95.
(in New York City, the Mayor Bill De Blasio has proposed to introduce, also for the drivers of Uber, the
obligation to acquire a license, suggesting the idea of establishing, even for them, a regulated system of
entry into the market. This proposal was not appreciated by Uber, who decided to include, in his app,
next to the ordinary display mode of the drivers, a fictitious “De Blasio mode,” in order to show the user
what would have happened if the proposal of the Mayor had been accepted, with the disappearance of
cars in circulation and the communication of a waiting time of 25 minutes).
90.

Belviso, supra note 4, at 151–52.

91.

Id. at 152.

92.
Id.; see also Jeremy Horpedahl, Ideology Über Alles? Economics Bloggers on Uber, Lyft,
and Other Transportation Network Companies, ECON. J. WATCH, 360 (2015).
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Nonetheless, the overall picture seems to be constituted by a myriad of
facets, derived also by the federal structure of the United States.93 When the
taxi industry was first regulated, no one could have imagined ridesharing
services like Uber, as a result of technology and innovation.94 As a
consequence, it is up to the States to support the experience and the services
that Uber provides.95 “Society is forever evolving and it is in the best interest
of the country, consumers, businesses, and the government to allow these
new companies to innovate.”96
B. Uber in Europe: A General Background
“Information technology and Internet services are considered to be key
tools for economic growth and innovation in the European Union.”97 The
strategy for the digital single market has been set out by the Commission's
Communication, which highlighted that in order to complete the internal
market, it is necessary to remove barriers and fill the remaining regulatory
gaps.98 The full implementation of the digital market, offered directly online
or through applications on Internet, is in fact still limited by restriction
measures put in place by States and private behaviors, introducing obstacles
to its development.99 Moreover, it was rightly pointed out that “technologies
move too quickly for regulatory comfort.”100 As a result, the European Union
system, together with the member States, are now in front of the need of
regulating previously non-existent or even inconceivable cases, that have
transnational relevance.101
Today, as to the non-scheduled urban transport, the European regulatory
scenario seems to be highly regulated.102 This picture tends to be
homogeneous, as it is characterized by “licensing systems, quotas,
administrative tariffs, public service obligations and strict distinctions
between taxi services and rental services with drivers.”103
93.

Belviso, supra note 4, at 152.

94.

Posen, supra note 83, at 432.

95.

Belviso, supra note 4, at 152.

96.

Posen, supra note 83, at 433.

97.
Gianpaolo Maria Ruotolo, Il caso Uber nel mercato unico digitale [The Uber Case in the
Digital Single Market], OSSERVATORIO EUROPEO [O.E.] 429, 429 (2018).
98.

Id.

99.

Id.

100.

Id.

101.

Id. at 430.

102.

Belviso, supra note 4, at 152.

103.

Id.
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After the new economic operator entered the market, there has been a
trend towards homogeneity.104 Specifically, after the entrance of Uber in the
most important cities in Europe, in fact, it followed “the claims of the
traditional operators of the sector, then the actions of the various
administrations involved, and finally the decisions taken by the national
courts, almost never willing to accept the requests of the exponents of the
new economy.”105
This attitude of closure has not only affected the Uberpop service, but
also to the Uberblack service.106 The former —Uberpop— is a service of
intermediation between non-professional drivers and users.107 This service
is, as it is easy to assume, the one that has generated more problems, because
of the greater detachment that characterizes its offer, compared to that
traditionally made within the market.108 As to the second one —Uberblack—
“is a service of intermediation between professional drivers and users:
through this service, drivers already holders of NCC authorization (e.g.
noleggio con conducente), and therefore professionals, also become drivers
of Uber, offering a service additional and parallel to the traditional one.”109
The judges found themselves having to interpret the nature of the
activity carried out by Uber, in order to understand if, behind the guise of
inter-electronic mediation, lies, indeed, a substantial transport activity, and
unfair competitive practices.110 Specifically, as part of the ongoing battle of
the Uber with the European Union (EU), the European Court of Justice (ECJ)
was tasked with understanding how the activity of the Uber can be classified:
whether to classify it as a provider of transport, or services, and, therefore,
how it should be regulated.111 Uber has tried to impose its business model
and technological innovation throughout Europe, with a value of more than
40 billion dollars.112 As a response, it has been strong the resistance of the
European Community, considering the tactics implemented by Uber to be

104.

Id. at 153.

105.

Id.

106.

Id.

107.

Belviso, supra note 4, at 153.

108.

Id.

109.

Id.

110.

Belviso, supra note 4, at 156.

111. Ijechi Nazirah Nwaozuzu, Goliath v. Goliath: The Significance of EU Law in the Battle
Between Uber and the EU (2017) (unpublished thesis, National University of Singapore) (on file with
National
University
of
Singapore),
https://www.academia.edu/36473387/
Goliath_v_Goliath_The_significance_of_EU_Law_in_the_battle_between_Uber_and_the_EU
(last
visited Sept. 19, 2019).
112.

Id.
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anti-competitive.113 The legal actions taken by the national authorities offer
important insights into the battle against Uber.114 Accordingly, it is important
to illustrate the experience of the main states belonging to the European
Union and, in the next section, analyze how the Commission, the Member
States, and Uber have acted in the Uber battle against the European Union,
in their respective interests, focusing the attention on the Spanish and Italian
experience.115
In France, where Uber has taken its first steps, the adoption of the 2014
Thèvenoud Law116 has re-regulated the non-scheduled urban transport sector
through several changes to the original transport code.117 It is precisely on
the basis of these provisions introduced therein that the Cour d'Appel de
Paris has inhibited the provision of the Uberpop service, considered a form
of unfair competition.118 As to Germany, there is a highly administered
market and courts, both administrative and civil, have placed themselves in
a position of clear closure vis-à-vis the new market player.119 In the
Netherlands, which as a matter of fact is characterized by a more liberal
system, the Uberpop service has been inhibited.120 In Italy, it is before the
courts that the terrain of conflict between traditional carriers and the new
entrant has developed.121 Specifically, the intervention concerned both the
Uberblack service and the Uberpop service.122 However, only with reference
to the latter service did the ordinary judge come to configure the unfair
competition and inhibit the assets of the service.123 Finally, in Spain, there is
also here a market full of rules and hostile jurisprudence that inhibits the
services offered by the new entrant, as we will see in the next paragraph.124
However, before discussing the specifics of decisions taken at the
judicial level, it is necessary to explain the internal decision-making
mechanism, at the National and European level (e.g. Member States and
113.

Id.

114.

Id.

115.

Id.

116. See Loi 2014-1104 du 1 octobre 2014 relative aux taxis et aux voitures de transport avec
chauffeur [Law 2014-1104 of October 1, 2014 relative to taxis and transport vehicles with driver],
LEGIFRANCE, Oct. 2, 2014, p. 15938.
117.

Belviso, supra note 4, at 153.

118.

Id.

119.

Id.

120.

Id.

121.

Id. at 155.

122.

Belviso, supra note 4, at 155.

123.

Id. at 155–56.

124.

Id. at 156.
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European Union).125 The European Law allows National Courts to decide on
matters that directly affect the Member State at issue.126 Then, the European
authorities of competence, and, thus, the European Law, act as a mechanism
to control the proportionality and validity of decisions and actions taken at
National level.127 Specifically, Article 12(3) of Directive 2006/123/EC (e.g.
the Services Directive) and Article 3(4) of Directive 2000/31/EC (e.g. the
Electronic Commerce Directive) grant national authorities and, therefore,
Member States, the power to regulate matters occurring at national level,
provided that they do not conflict with the European Directives.128
As to Uber, the Advocate General has declared that, according to the
Directive 98/34/CE5, the Member States “may prohibit and punish as a
matter of criminal law, the illegal exercise of [UberPop] transport activities .
. . without notifying the Commission of the draft law in advance.”129
Nevertheless, this Opinion has two sides to be considered.130 On the one
hand, it gives Member States a very strong power to implement regulations
against Uber's anti-competitive strategies.131 On the other hand, the adequacy
of the actions taken within this power must be assessed.132 The objective of
the Advocate General, through this Opinion, was to allow the national
authorities to directly regulate the anti-competitive tactics of Uber.133
However, this Opinion has been considered dangerous, because it may
introduce a precedent whereby National Authorities may regulate internal
matters by applying national laws even before binding European
directives.134 Therefore, the European Commission135 considered it
appropriate to stress that national authorities should adopt proportionate
measures in the context of the battle against Uber.136 The European
Commission has in fact clarified that the bans and prohibitions —as to the
Directive 98/34/CE5— “can only be used as a last resort.”137 However, the
125.

See Nwaozuzu, supra note 111.

126.

Id. at 2.

127.

Id.

128.

Id.

129.

Id.; see also Case C-320/16, Uber France SAS, 2017 E.C.R. I-X.

130.

See Nwaozuzu, supra note 111, at 3.

131.

Id.

132.

Id.

133.

Id.

134.

Id.

135. See A European Agenda for the Collaborative Economy, EUROPEAN COMMISSION (June 2,
2016), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-2001_en.htm.
136.

See Nwaozuzu, supra note 111, at 4.

137.

Id.
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States, in response, claimed that Uber's anti-competitive tactics were so
serious and obvious that imposing bans was the only possible way out.138
The decision expressed by the European Commission has therefore had the
objective of favoring, in some way, the international companies that seek to
enter the single market, while protecting the public interests of the national
authorities.139 “EU Law’s ability to check these measures thus serves to not
only protect genuine public concerns within Member States, but also to
ensure that measures set against anti-competitive tactics are both valid and
effective in meeting their objectives.”140
“Uber's strategy in entering the single market, . . . was to radically
change the status quo and make the market bend.”141 In response, European
law has verified and balanced the measures taken at national level against
Uber, seeking to ensure that the same measures could guarantee a balance of
competing values.142 In fact, “the battle between the European Union and
Uber appears to be rooted in a conflict of values.”143 The European Court,
on the one hand, seeks to balance the freedom of services, respect for
competition rules, and consumer protection.144 Uber, on the other hand, tries
to fight for the freedom of its consumers.145
Uber will continue to fight for its place in the single market.146 The
European Union has the objective of creating a digital single market by 2020,
and one may finally see how the future battles between the Uber and the EU
will proceed to enforce EU law in its current form, or modify it
definitively.147

138.

Id.

139.

Id. at 5.

140.

Id.

141. Nwaozuzu, supra note 111, at 5; see Elias Isquith, Uber fail: Why the Start-up Giant
Stumbled in Europe — and How it Could Happen in the U.S., SALON (June 1, 2016),
https://www.salon.com/2016/01/06/uber_fail_why_the_start_up_giant_stumbled_in_europe_and_how_i
t_could_ happen_in_the_u_s/.
142.

Nwaozuzu, supra note 111, at 6.

143.

Id. at 5.

144.

Id.

145.

Id.

146.

Id. at 8.

147.

Nwaozuzu, supra note 111, at 8.
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1. The Experience in Spain
As happened in other countries, in Spain one accusation is directed at
Uber: unfair competitor.148 The Spanish experience will go from the Spanish
courts up to the European Court of Justice.149 Before discussing the Uber
case in Spain, it is important to present a brief regulatory analysis of
competition law, in order to understand the Spanish experience.150
One of the most important constitutional principles —Article 38 of the
Spanish Constitution— is the freedom of enterprise, with respect to which
the public authorities guarantee and protect its exercise.151 This regulation
implies, among other things, the prevention and eradication of a series of acts
that distort competition in the market, affecting both market participants on
the supply side (companies, intermediaries and other producers) and on the
demand side (consumers and users).152 These type of practices —known as
unfair— are widely regulated by the Spanish Law of Unfair Competition
3/1991.153 Specifically, Article 15 deals with the violation of the
aforementioned rules.154 The latter state that it is considered unfair to prevail
on the market, thanks to a competitive advantage acquired through the
violation of the laws, and to apply the law the advantage must be
significant.155 In fact, the second part of this Note makes us understand that
not all legal violations are, by extension, a source of unfair competition.156
After having analyzed the Spanish experience, we can now turn on the
Uber case.157 As we will see, the Spanish experience appears to be very
similar to the Italian one.158 On October 2014, an association of taxi drivers
in Barcelona (e.g. Elite Taxi) brought an action before the Barcelona
Commercial Court (e.g. Juzgado de lo Mercantil n. 3 de Barcelona), against
Uber (rectius, Uber Systems Spain S.L.), on several grounds.159 The first

148. Alejandro Fernández Ortega, El Caso Uber: Discusión de la Problemática y Análisis
Jurídico [Uber case: Discussion of the Problem and Legal Analysis] (Jan. 20, 2016) (unpublished thesis,
Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona) (on file with Facultat de Dret, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona).
149.

See Id.

150.

Id. at 16.

151.

Id.; see also C.E., art. 38, B.O.E. n. 311, Dec. 29, 1978 (Spain).

152.

Fernández, supra note 148, at 16.

153.

Id.; see Unfair Competition Law (B.O.E. 1991, 3) (Spain).

154.

Fernández, supra note 148, at 16.

155.

Id. at 17.

156.

Id.

157.

Id. at 18.

158.

Id. at 11.

159.

Belviso, supra note 4, at 157.
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claim was that of Uber infringing on the rules of non-scheduled urban
transport —Article 4 of Law 19/2003— which prescribes the obligation to
obtain a license and authorization to carry out transport activities in a
speculative, urban and inter-urban manner.160 Second, the association
claimed that there were the elements to think that Uber’s activities were
creating unfair competition, in violation of Law 3/1991 of the Spanish
Competition Law (e.g. Competencia Desleal).161 For these reasons, the
association asked the Court to order the company to cease its activity.162 The
commercial Court before which the case was brought, however, had doubts
as to whether that type of service was correctly placed on the market.163 In
other words, the issue was defining whether Uber was a provider of a
smartphone app connecting drivers and users, or a transport provider.164 This
question was referred directly from the Spanish Court to the European Court
of Justice, with the aim of defining whether the Uber service should be
regarded as a transport service —pursuant to Article 58 of the TFEU, or as
“an electronic mediation service belonging to the information society”—
pursuant to Article 56 TFEU, Directive 2006/123/EU, Directive 2000/31/EC
and Directive 98/34/EC.165
In its judgment of December 20, 2017 the European Court of Justice
pointed out that the company creates an offer of urban transport services by
technological means, e.g. its application, while not denying that Uber is an
intermediary between drivers and customers.166 Without the latter, drivers
would not be able to provide transport services.167 Thus, the Court
highlighted the relationship of instrumentality that exists between
intermediation and mobility, “such that the latter would not exist if there were

160.

Id.

161.

Id.

162.

Id.

163.

Id.

164.

Belvisio, supra note 4, at 157.

165. Id. In order to have a precise legal framework and to understand the decision of the
European Court, here a brief analysis of the laws at issue. First, Article 56 of the Treaty on the Functioning
of the European Union is one of vital importance, as it embodies the principle of the freedom to provide
services in the European law. This provision prohibits restrictions on the freedom to provide services
within the EU. In this respect, Directive 2006/123/EC defines the instruments to promote the freedom of
establishment and the free movement of service providers. On the other hand, Directive 98/34/EC of the
European Parliament lays down a procedure for the provision of information in the field of technical
standards and regulations. Finally, Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament deals with certain
legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce. Id.
166.

Belvisio, supra note 4, at 157.

167.

Id.
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not the first.”168 Moreover, “Uber exercises a decisive influence on the
performance of such drivers: establishing prices, intermediate payment,
controlling the conduct of drivers and also being able to decide to also
deactivate their profiles.”169 Such characteristics of the service rendered by
Uber show, even more clearly, their functional inseparability.170
Finally, the Court pointed out that the European concept of service in
the transport sector must be understood broadly “including not only transport
services considered as such, but also any service connected to a physical act
of transferring people or goods from one place to another through a means of
transport.”171 Accordingly, its activity must be subject to the entire Title VI
of the TFEU devoted to transport, and Article 58 TFEU, which deals with
the European rules on transport.172 However, transport is a matter of shared
competence, where both the European Union and the Member States may
adopt legal acts which are binding on them, and where the states have
competence where Union has not exercised it.173 In the absence of European
provisions on urban transport, the European Court of Justice can only hold
by stating that it is up to the Member States to regulate the conditions for the
provision of services which are, formally speaking, linked to intermediation
and, essentially, to mobility.174
This issue has been fundamental in the European Union.175 The position
of the Court of Justice on these aspects affected the outcome of the Uber case
and its establishment in Spain, but also the rules of the European game,
creates a precedent in the EU countries.176
In this context, “the European institutions have shown their interest in
strengthening the links between the digital economy and the single
market.”177 The Spanish professor and philosopher José Ortega y Gasset said
that “it is only possible to progress when you think big, you can only move
forward when you look far.”178

168.

Id.

169.

Id.

170.

Id.

171.

Belvisio, supra note 4, at 158.

172.

Id.

173.

Id.

174.

Id.

175.

Fernández, supra note 149, at 14.

176.

Id.

177.

Id. at 33.

178.

Id. at 45.
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2. The Experience in Italy
Before analyzing the solutions suggested by and adopted by the Italian
Court, we must reiterate that the service which the consumer accesses on
Uber is actually composed of two distinct parts: on the one hand, in fact, they
use the digital platform installed on smartphones in order to book the journey,
choose the route and pay; on the other hand, the same customer actually
benefits from a transport service.179 It is, therefore, a composite case in which
one of the two activities, taking place online on the platform, could actually
fall into the category of intermediation, while the other falls, without doubt,
in the category of passenger transport.180
First of all, it is important to remember that the judicial events in Italy
“did not concern Uber sic et simpliciter, but rather a specific service offered
by Uber —Uber Pop— with which it is actually offered . . . a service in many
ways similar to that of the traditional taxi.”181 “The difference is that the
Uber driver does not possess any professional license, but simply some basic
requirements imposed from the Californian society (e.g. driving license for
at least three years and without ever having had suspensions, criminal record,
etcetera).”182 It follows, that Uberpop —standing for “peer-to-peer rideshare
service”— allows the customer to share the use of the vehicle with the driver
and owner of the same vehicle, by simply paying a fee.183
In the spring of 2015, taxi trade unions in Milan, Genoa, and Turin
brought proceedings before the Court of Milan to request an order to
terminate Uber's activities in the Italian territory.184 They alleged that
UberPop, through its app, was engaged in unfair competition in the taxi
market, selling public transport services at much lower prices, and at the
same time, without having to comply with the mandatory requirements
imposed on taxi drivers.185 Accordingly, a decision was necessary and
urgent, as the appellants feared, in the long term, a large loss in profits.186
The Court of Milan therefore ruled, on May 25th, 2015, in favor of the
applicants.187 Specifically, the Court ordered UberPop to cease its activities
179.

Ruotolo, supra note 97, at 435.

180. Damien Geradin, Online Intermediation Platforms and Free Trade Principles – Some
Reflections on the Uber Preliminary Ruling Case, SSRN 1, 3 (Apr. 6, 2016),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2759379.
181.

Modenese, supra note 13, at 14.

182.

Id.

183.

Geradin, supra note 181, at 4.

184.

Alessio Di Amato, Uber and the Sharing Economy, IT. L. J., 177, 177 (2016).

185.

Id.

186.

Id.

187.

Id. at 177–78.
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on the Italian market immediately.188 Uber, in its defensive arguments,
firmly stated that its activity was not a transport activity, but simply a
technological platform.189 Specifically, Uber stated that its UberPop app was
limited to create an intermediation between drivers and passengers, and that
Uber had nothing to do with the relationship between them, or the activity
carried out.190 As a result of this, Uber claimed that it operates in a
completely different market, and that limiting its access to the Italian market
would be in breach of European principles of competition law, and of Italian
competition law.191 In response, the Italian Court had first noted that the
services provided by Uber cannot be qualified as a simple intermediation tool
to facilitate car sharing with other passengers.192 Accordingly, the Court
outlined the difference: while in car-sharing services the car is shared with
other passengers, who contribute to the costs (e.g. fuel, management costs,
tolls), UberPop offers the possibility to motorists to sell a transport service
for profit.193 For the foregoing reasons, the role of Uber cannot be considered
extraneous, especially since it has the possibility to influence the prices of
the service, which are calculated through the mechanism of Surge Pricing
(e.g. increase of the tariff to the increase in demand).194 On the basis of these
considerations, the Court of Milan found it undisputable that the Uber market
is not different from that of taxis, as UberPop satisfies in equal measure the
same service offered by taxis.195 However, while taxi drivers have to meet
tough requirements (e.g. car inspections, special insurance, taxi license, et
cetera), UberPop drivers do not have to meet the same requirements.196 By
doing so, UberPop drivers can make a profit out of offering services at better
prices, thus saving costs.197 This is one of the main reasons why the Court of
Milan observed that the UberPop service is substantially contrary to
European and Italian principles of competition.198
Furthermore, the purpose of the detailed regulation of taxis is to protect
the health and safety of customers, which is why taxi vehicles are periodically
checked, the taxi driver undergoes periodic examinations to verify their
188.

Id. at 178.

189.

Di Amato, supra note 184, at 178.

190.

Id.

191.

Id.

192.

Id.

193.

Id.

194.

Di Amato, supra note 184, at 178.

195.

Id.

196.

Id. at 178–79.

197.

Id. at 179.

198.

Id.
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physical and mental capacity, and there is adequate insurance for
passengers.199 The fact that Uber escapes these requirements, as stated by
the Court of Milan, is unacceptable and contrary to the law.200 The value of
personal safety is the value that —according to the Court— prevails over the
value of the market.201 This is affirmed by Article 41 of the Italian
Constitution,202 and by Article 168 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union.203
Uber’s Italian General Manager, Carlo Tursi, asserted how Uber entered
the Italian market with a fairly ambitious project: to offer Italians an
alternative service and quality in the mobility.204 What Uber hopes in Italy
is to finally witness an update of the legislation in the sector.205 The initial
goal is to introduce a low-cost transport services, facilitate the mobility, thus
helping the communities where transport innovation is needed the most.206
The final goal is to change the way Italians think about transportation, where
having a car is a choice, rather than an obligation.207
C. Uber in Latin America: The Fastest Growing Region in the World
Latin America208 has faced and continues to face many problems related
to urban transport and urban mobility, given the absence and inefficiency of
public service, informal transport systems, congestion, road accidents, and
pollution.209 All of this clearly has different impacts in different cities.210 As
a matter of fact, Latin America is a region of social inequality, dominated by
199.

Di Amato, supra note 184, at 179.

200.

Id.

201.

Id.

202.

Id.; see also Art. 41 Costituzione [Cost.] (It.).

203. Di Amato, supra note 184, at 179; see also Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union art. 168, May 9, 2008, 2008, O.J. (C 326) 47 [hereinafter TFEU].
204. Biagio Simonetta, Uber e l’Italia, Storia d’Amore (Turbolenta) Lunga Cinque Anni [Uber
and Italy, History of Love (Turbulent) Five Years Long], SOLE 24 ORE ECONOMIA [S.24.O.E.] (Feb. 14,
2018),
https://www.ilsole24ore.com/art/uber-e-l-italia-storia-d-amore-turbolenta-lunga-cinque-anniAEJV2nwD.
205.

Id.

206.

Id.

207.

Id.

208. See Jonathan Moed, Uber's Wild Ride To Make Latin America Its Fastest Growing Region,
FORBES (Dec. 20, 2018, 5:21 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jonathanmoed/2018/12/20/is-uberoperating-illegally-in-its-fastest-growing-region/#5f4f28b61925.
209. Paola Jirón, Sustainable Urban Mobility in Latin America and the Caribbean, REP. ON HUM.
SETTLEMENT 1, 1 (2013), http://www.unhabitat.org/grhs/2013.
210.

Id.
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different social classes, and transport accessibility problems have a different
impact.211 What the whole region has in common is the process of
accelerated urbanization, and a very large percentage of urban population.212
There has been incredible urbanization in Latin America in the last 40 years,
and the urban population has grown from 50% of the population in 1970, to
80% in 2013.213 As a result of the urbanization process, as many cities were
born, they were not able to face the transport system in an organized and
planned manner.214 The supply of public transport has not kept pace with the
growth in demand for transport.215 This increase in transport demand has
inevitably generated an increase in the number of cars in most cities.216 As a
result, income has grown and there has been a great expansion in the
production of cars and motorcycles, with an average of about 90 vehicles per
1000 inhabitants.217 The rate of motorization exceeds that of the Middle East,
Asia, and Africa.218 Unfortunately, institutional weakness and government
control have not been able to respond promptly to these needs, thus
contributing to chaos and security.219 In order to address these difficulties,
some major cities have taken steps to promote progress in an effort to
improve mobility conditions.220 Brazil, and in particular cities such as
Curitiba, have implemented innovative and integrated forms of transport.221
The city of Medellin, Colombia, continuously incorporates new and
innovative forms of transport, also and above all thanks to the new Mayor
Federico Gutiérrez.222
Latin America is Uber’s most profitable region and fastest growing
region in the world.223 Active riders amount to twenty-five million per
month, in more than two-hundred metropolitan areas in the fifteen countries
211.

Id.

212.

Id.

213. Patricia Yañez-Pagans et al., Urban Transport Systems in Latin America and the Caribbean:
Challenges and Lessons Learned, IZA INST. OF LAB. ECON. 3, 7 (2018).
214.

Jirón, supra note 209, at 1.

215.

Yañez-Pagans et al., supra note 213, at 8.

216.

Jirón, supra note 209, at 1.

217.

Yañez-Pagans et al., supra note 213, at 7.

218.

Id.

219.

Id. at 8.

220.

Jirón, supra note 209, at 2.

221.

Id.

222. Ana María Aray Mariño, Medellín Could Become the Capital of Electric Mobility in Latin
America, LATIN AM. POST (Jan. 5, 2019), https://latinamericanpost.com/25657-medellin-could-becomethe-capital-of-electric-mobility-in-latin-america.
223.

Moed, supra note 208.
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of Latin America.224 The success of the Uber company in Latin America is
due to several reasons.225 First, it is its own technological platform and
experience.226 Second, it is the important need for change in the transport
service, given the large number of South American population.227 In
addition, the geographical and cultural proximity to the global base of the
American Uber, as well as the similarities in terms of technological
preferences between Latin America and America, is what places Uber in this
competitive position.228
Nonetheless, in many regions Uber remain unregulated, operating
without the support of local governments, or even worse, directly against the
governments.229 Despite its parallel growth in the rest of the world,
especially in the United States, Uber in Latin America has encountered
significant resistance and conflict, with uncertainties about its future.230 A
major factor is that the issue of mobility in Latin America, which is
controversial.231 The impact and growth of Uber has been so great because
of the great need for change that cities have required.232 However, the
absence of regulations on the topic places Uber as a man with no land, where
it has not received express consent from the government.233 The general
motivation of animosity and conflict of “taxi drivers against Uber in Latin
America is simple: Uber is taking away [its] customers . . . .”234 Despite the
turmoil surrounding Uber and the absence of regulation, Uber continues to
expand aggressively, although aware of the insidious situation.235
Uber's presence in Latin America is wide, and the public has welcomed
a large and positive change in the old transport.236 It is up to local
governments to take action and try to mediate between the idea of an old
transport system and new technologies.237 Humberto Pacheco —Uber’s
Regional General Manager in Mexico— pointed out “[a]t the end of the day
224.

Id.

225.

Id.

226.

Id.

227.

Id.

228.

Moed, supra note 208.
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this isn't a question of Uber, it's a question of smart cities. It's a question of
progress and development, of how people can really benefit from the changes
technology will bring . . . .”238

1. The Experience in Colombia
In order to understand the regulatory issues that have arisen in
Colombia, it is again important to point out the laws that underlie the right of
transport in the country.239 The starting point is Article 5 of Law 336/1996,
by which the National Transport Statute is adopted.240 Specifically, it
illustrates the difference between the public and private service.241 Essential
public service, in Colombia, is granted by law to public transportation
companies.242 As a result, it will imply the priority of the general public
interest over the individual’s interest, for example, the guarantee of the
provision of the service, and the protection of users, according to the rights
and obligations indicated in the Statute herein.243
As to private service, the same article places the private transport service
in this regulatory scenario.244 It points out how “the private transport is one
that tends to satisfy the needs of mobilization of persons or things, within the
scope of the exclusive activities of natural and/or legal persons.”245 As such,
private transport companies “must comply with the regulations established
by the Department of Transportation.”246
Article 9 of Law 105/1993 applies sanctions in case of violations.247 It
states that the transportation will impose sanctions for violation to the
regulating norms of the transport, according to the special dispositions that
govern each mode of transport.248 In other words, the National Transport
Statute will come into play in case of violation of transport regulations.249
Whoever contracts, provides or drives private vehicles or equipment, uses
238.

Moed, supra note 208.

239. See Oficina Jurídica Ministerio de Transporte [Legal Office Department of Transportation],
enero 15, 2019, Sol Ángel Cala Acosta, MT No. 20191340006951 (Colom.) [hereinafter Department of
Transportation].
240.
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transport infrastructure, violates or facilitates the violation of regulations,
will be subject to the sanctions provided for in Article 9 of Law 336/1996.250
In addition to the foregoing, Article 131 of Law 769/2002, whereby the
National Land Transit Code (e.g. Código Nacional de Tránsito Terrestre) is
issued, as amended by Article 21 of Law 1383/2010, provides that violators
of traffic regulations will be sanctioned with the imposition of fines,
according to the type of infraction.251 For example, the driver and/or owner
of a motor vehicle that incurs any of the aforementioned infractions will be
sanctioned with a fine equivalent to thirty current legal minimum wages.252
“When Uber arrived in Colombia in October 2013, the concept of a
private transport service mediated by an app was as new as it was challenging
to the country's regulatory framework.”253 In 2016, the Superintendence of
Ports and Transportation (e.g. Superintendencia de Puertos y Transporte),
sanctioned the company Uber Colombia S.A.S. with a fine of COP
$344,727,000 for failing to comply with the order to cease the facilitation
and promotion of the provision of unauthorized transport services in
Colombia.254 “On August 19, 2016, the Delegate of Transit and Transport,
after having previously sanctioned Uber Colombia S.A.S. for facilitating the
violation of rules on passenger transportation, ordered the company to stop
promoting, through mass media and advertising, the use of the technological
platform that allows the illegal provision of the service.”255 Notwithstanding
the order, the Superintendence found that Uber Colombia S.A.S. was still
promoting the use of the platform.256 For example, back in November 2nd,
2016, Uber S.A.S. was ordered to stop promoting its unauthorized
transportation services in the Cali Airport, through its concessionaire
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Aerocali S.A.257 Specifically, the Superintendence of Ports and Transport
ordered Aerocali S.A., administrator of the Alfonso Bonilla Aragón Airport,
“to guarantee immediate compliance with the instruction given by the entity
last August 19th, through Resolution 40313.”258 The Resolution required
“compliance with the regulations that prohibit the facilitation and/or
promotion of the provision of unauthorized transportation services
throughout the country.”259
The Santos government, through its Department of Transportation,
called the platform illegal and the police chased those who used it.260 In
December 2018, the Department of Transportation issued a circular in which
it reiterated to the transit authorities of the country that all drivers violating
Article 26 of Law 769/2002, for example, providing public transport service
with private vehicles without a reasonable cause, must have their driver’s
license suspended.261 Private drivers using their vehicles for the illegal
provision of public passenger transport, will have their driving license
cancelled and will only be able to apply for it again in 25 years later.262
With the arrival of the government of Iván Duque, who has expressed
his interest in promoting the so-called orange economy, the possibility of a
path towards legalization has been raised.263 Nonetheless, that did not
prevent the Department of Transportation —e.g. Ministerio de Transporte—
from persecuting those who derive their incomes from Uber’s activities, as
public transport service using a private car, against the aforementioned
laws.264 “In at least one case, that led to an Uber driver having his license
taken away for 25 years.”265
Then on January 15, 2019, the legal office of the Colombian Department
of Transportation intervened as to the legality of Uber.266 First, it is important
to note that, in accordance with Article 8.1 and 8.8 of the Decree 087 of
January 17th, 2011, the legal advisory office of the Department of
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Transportation has the duty to advise and/or assist the Department and other
dependencies of the Department in the application and interpretation of
constitutional and legal norms.267 The office deals with and resolves
inquiries and petitions submitted to the Department by persons of a public or
private nature.268 In the case discussed here, the office responded to a petition
presented by a private individual to the Department of Transportation,
through file No. 20183030126012 of December 17, 2018.269 Specifically, it
has been inquired whether it is legal for a citizen to contact and contract
transport services offered by a vehicle that is attached to Uber.270 The office
has explained that Uber —although it defines itself a technological platform,
not providing transportation service— is not recognized by the Ministry of
Transport as a technological platform in the terms of paragraph 4 of article
2.2.1.3.2.1. of Decree 1079 of 2015 and articles 5 and 6 of Resolution No
2163 of 2016 issued by the Ministry of Transport.271 The Ministry of
Transport has issued the Circular No. 24 dated December 30th, 2014,
requesting “the immobilization of private and public service vehicles that
provide unauthorized service through the “Uber” platform,” for failure to
comply with the regulatory provisions of the Ministry of Transport and, in
particular the aforementioned Circular, resulting in appropriate
administrative inquiries and the imposition of any penalties.272
Luis Lopez, Uber's public affairs manager, argued to the contrary that
Uber is a private service.273 Specifically, “Uber calls it Private Transport by
Intermediate Platforms (PTIP) and considers it a new category of
transport.”274 According to data from Uber’s headquarters in the United
States, Uber in Colombia has about “83,000 drivers and is used monthly by
about 2.1 million passengers.”275 “For Uber, the satisfaction of its users goes
to the heart of its commercial proposal, and is essential for its long-term
survival.”276 “Two years ago, the firm opened a specialized support service
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for the region, managed from its Experience Center in Costa Rica.”277 “For
Pacheco [the Uber Regional General Manager in Mexico], Uber is not
outside the law and, in fact, is looking for a dialogue with the Colombian
authorities to define a form of regulation.”278 “In addition, he said that it is
important to differentiate the shared mobility service from traditional
transport systems, which have existed for more than 20 years.”279 “He said
that Uber pays taxes in Colombia and that, in case of regulation, he would be
willing to contribute more.”280 “If, as its directors hope, a change of
government opens the doors to a more fruitful dialogue, Uber would soon
have the opportunity to operate in Colombia under the protection of a modern
legal framework.”281
“The debate about the legality of Uber is worldwide, which is why the
platform tries to work with governments to seek a regulation that, according
to the firm, allows conditions of competition to be the same for them and for
taxis.”282 “Justin Kintz, [Uber's] vice-president of Public Policy and
Communications, points out that Bogotá was the first city in Latin America
where they arrived five years ago and the issue is still not regulated, but there
are 46 cities in the world where there is already clarity in the rules of the
game.”283

2. The Experience in Costa Rica
Uber has been operating in Costa Rica for two years, generating turmoil
in the public transport sector.284 In particular, “the main opposition to Uber
in Costa Rica is the Union of Costa Rican Taxi Drivers (UTC), which has
existed since the 1960s,” and which activity has been made legal by the Costa
Rican Public Transport Authority (CTP).285
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“Costa Rica, since the 1980s, has been considered to have a highly
inefficient public transport system.”286 It was “in response to this critical
situation that the current government promoted a series of legislative reforms
aimed at modernizing the system of remunerated transport of buses and
taxis.”287 “At the beginning of 2000, in the midst of the these transformations
of public transport,” the Public Transport Council was created, together with
the enactment of the Law No. 7969/2000, regulating the Public Service of
Remunerated Transport of Persons in Vehicles.288
While it was believed that the taxi system had managed to complete its
modernization, “. . . a proliferation in private transport services occurred,
creating social tensions [especially] with those who provided the service in a
regulated manner, [meaning taxis], in accordance with the provisions of Law
No. 7969.”289 The Legislative Assembly promoted a series of reforms “that
concluded in 2011 with the enactment of Law No. 8955, [regulating the] . . .
Public Service of Remunerated Transport of People in Vehicles, . . . that
gave way to a new form of individual public transport, which was called the
Special Stable Taxi Service permit, better known by its acronym
SEETAXI.”290
The entry, in the recent years, of technology platform companies
brought new challenges into the Costa Rica legislation, currently endowed
with a legal framework designed to regulate traditional business models, such
as taxis.291 This is one of the reasons why the Legislative Assembly, together
with the Executive Power, deemed it necessary to provide the country with a
new legislation.292 On January 23, 2019, the deputies introduced a new
reform project regulating Uber in Costa Rica —as well as other shared
transport app— and updated the taxi mode.293 The reform project had the
aim of regulating the activity carried out by Uber, taxis and future actors
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entering the Costa Rican market, which provides services of remunerated
transport of people, using the so-called “collaborative digital platforms.”294
The Legislative Assembly, in its exposure of the motifs, underlined how
the advances in Internet communications, smartphones and online
applications have facilitated the development and adoption of paid passenger
transport, thus improving mobility.295 This type of service, offered by
technology platform companies, has led nations globally to continually
review their legislation and public policies.296 In other words, States had to
ensure that the national legislations reflect the current state of the economy
and guarantees compliance with legal responsibilities, citizen safety and the
rights of people who integrate this new type of initiative, under a scheme of
fair competition.297
The President of the Republic of Costa Rica, Carlos Alvarado, has
declared that the government’s commitment, with this reform project, was to
advance in a system where taxis and transportation technology platforms
coexist in conditions of fair competition.298 Among the most relevant points,
raised in the Reform, is the fact that Transport Platform Companies (EPT),
such as Uber, must pay “13% of value added tax (VAT) as well as 8.5% for
remittances abroad.”299 In addition, they will be declared as public
transportation services and must be registered with the Public Transportation
Council (CTP) for legal operation in the country.300 Based on the resources
generated by the EPT, a standard of 3% of the operation would be established
to create a National Mobility Fund for the modernization of public
transportation.301 Rodolfo Méndez Mata, Minister of Public Works and
Transport (MOPT) described the project as “balanced” and recalled the
importance of regulating technological platforms where many citizens find
employment.302 To draft the proposal, the Executive Branch investigated the
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matter in cities such as New York, Los Angeles, London, Madrid and Mexico
City, where it found an agreement for the coexistence of services.303
What will happen to Uber in Costa Rica is uncertain.304 Nonetheless,
Uber claims that it has been working “within a framework of legality and
seeking to be part of the development of Costa Rica.”305 Uber will keep
asking the government to listen to the multiple voices that call for the
existence of “a regulation that promotes innovation, development and
technology.”306
D. The Comparative Paragraph
It is obvious, given the analysis above, that it would be wrong to think
that Uber and its regulations could be traced back to traditional national
transport regulations.307
The legal battles in recent years in Europe and Latin American have
demonstrated the need for governments to rethink their approach to new
technologies, and review their regulatory instruments to address today's
challenges.308
The arrival of Uber internationally has created turbulence in national
legislatures who, taken by surprise, had to understand the complexity of the
phenomenon and find rules that could regulate these technological and
collaborative platforms.309 Governments had to settle disputes arising from
the resistance of traditional transport operators and local authorities.310 For
this reason, governments have been called upon to make decisions.311 “The
demand for sharing services is insatiable and growing, as consumers
increasingly rely on technological tools to meet their needs, even in the face
of their illegality.”312 Therefore, banning new platforms from progress is not
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a long-term solution.313 Rather, sharing services should be made transparent,
formalized, and regulated.314
In the European Union, as in Latin America, creating legislative
uniformity seems to be difficult to achieve.315 Technology platforms like
Uber function generally the same everywhere, regardless of where their users
are located; however, the external effects on local economies appear to be
significantly different.316 This is the reason why different policies are needed
for different cities, and even more so for countries in Europe and Latin
America.317 However, while many European and South American
governments have had a mentality of opposition to new forms of innovation
to replace traditional systems, this is slowly giving way to deregulation,
opening up the market to new players.318 Allowing technology platforms to
operate alongside traditional operators will remain a pure political
decision.319
IV. CONCLUSION
“The Uber case fully embodies an aspiration . . . : that of being modern
and in step with market and technology.”320 “The market tends to age the
rules” causing the law to risks being obsolete.321 This Note shows how Uber
“did not have the space to express itself as it could.”322 In fact, “instead of
enhancing the value of innovation, there have been different requests,
interests and considerations, which place the emphasis not only on the
already detected unfair competition, but also on the lack of logic of sharing,
on the lucrative purpose of the new entrant, and so on.”323
Undoubtedly, the opportunities evidenced by the “Uber revolution are
great, connected to the development of the market, to efficiency, to economic
recovery and, to offer users a quality service at a low price.”324 Therefore,
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the law must change, in order to preserve its usefulness.325 The courts may
also be called upon to suggest solutions to make the legal apparatus more
suitable to face the challenge.326
All that remains, is to wait for national legislatures aware of the fact that
the delay creates a never-ending jurisprudential quagmire and expands the
function of the Courts beyond their own institutional mission.327
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